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Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can
directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results
from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they
provide the best explanation for some seemingly non-rational behaviors, like akrasia, impul-
sivity, or apparent self-deception.This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical,
empirical, and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception
and on the “cognitive unconscious” I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if there
is a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empirical vindications of the M-
unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for the conceptual objections, they compel us to
modify the classical picture of the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states
and processes must be affective states and processes that the subject really feels and
experiences – and which are in this sense conscious – even though they are not, or not
well, cognitively accessible to him. Dual-process psychology and the literature on cold–hot
empathy gaps partly support the existence of such M-unconscious states.
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It is usually easy to explain someone’s behavior. We can often read
the motives that explain his actions directly on his moves and
expressions. When we cannot, it is always possible to ask the per-
son the reason for his actions. I would normally explain why John
pulled the trigger of the gun while pointing it at his wife by citing
his desire to get rid of her and his belief that this is an excellent way
of doing just that. If I had some doubts, I could ask John. He might
tell me that he’s no murderer and he just wanted to wound her. I
might accordingly revise my explanation. Provided that John is“in
good faith,” I should end up with a pretty good explanation. This
explanation will have the following form: a motive for an action A
– roughly1 a desire for a given outcome and the belief that A is the
best way to achieve this outcome – explains the action A. There
are much tougher cases though, in which this method will not be
of much help, even if the subject whose behavior we are trying to
interpret can answer all our questions, and even if he is perfectly
honest.
AKRASIA AND IMPULSIVITY
The cases I am thinking of have bewildered philosophers ever
since Plato. They involve actions that do not seem rational. Con-
sider for example, weakness of the will or akrasia. Someone who is
akratic seems to be acting against his preferences. A typical exam-
ple involves someone, say Paul, who sees someone else’s wallet on
the ground, who knows he should not take it, wants to be honest
“and everything”, prefers, all things considered not to take it, . . .
1See (Pacherie, 2008a) for some problems with this basic account of motives and
for a sophisticated alternative.
but yet, steals the wallet. Paul “sees the better and approves it, but
he follows the worse”. Notice that Paul might, but need not be act-
ing impulsively. He might as well pursue the worse, so to speak,“in
cold blood”. In any case, he will in good faith deny having the pref-
erence that would explain his behavior, so it seems reasonable not
to attribute him this preference. But how then should we explain
his misdemeanor? (compare: “John chose A over B even though
he judged A to be more expensive/less pretty. . .” to “John chose
A over B even though he judged that all things considered, it was
better to chose B”).
APPARENT SELF-DECEPTION
Consider also cases of “self-deception”. A victim of self-deception
seems to be deceiving himself into believing something false. He
believes something against the evidence, and he seems to do so
intentionally. For example,Mary,whowas recently diagnosedwith
a cancer claims that the diagnosis ismisguided and she really seems
to believe it, but she avoids her physicians as well as conversa-
tions on medical topics. She seems somehow to be lying to herself
about her disease. Self-deception names both the phenomenon
“someone seems to be deceiving oneself” and its natural explana-
tion “this person actually deceives herself”. We shall see that many
refuse this natural explanation so it will be useful to have two
different names here. We will call apparent self-deception the phe-
nomenon, and self-deception its natural explanation. In any case,
being “apparently self-deceived”Mary will in good faith deny hav-
ing the intention to blind herself, so it will be difﬁcult to explain
why she does not acknowledge her disease and why she avoids
doctors.
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THE MOTIVATIONAL UNCONSCIOUS (M-UNCONSCIOUS)
Because the motives that would most naturally explain the myste-
rious actions of Mary and Paul are not acknowledged by them, it
might be tempting, in both cases, to claim that they have uncon-
scious motives. There is an additional, and so to speak logical,
reason to claim that there must be unconscious motives in the
case of apparent self-deception. If Mary really deceived herself
into falsely believing that she is perfectly healthy, as it seems she
did, it would be paradoxical to suppose that her motive – her
belief that she is sick and her desire to deceive herself into believ-
ing that she is not – was conscious. We cannot indeed be deceived
by someone when we are aware of his or her desires to deceive us,
or even when we are aware that what he or she says is false. The
only way to solve this paradox, it might be claimed, and to make
sense of the possibility of deceiving oneself, is to posit unconscious
motives. If Mary only unconsciously knows that she is ill, and if
she only unconsciously desires to believe that she is not ill, then she
might actually deceive herself. Notice that this last argument does
not rely on the claim that Mary is in good faith when she speaks
about her motives and that conscious motives are always avail-
able to introspection. It only relies on the claim that she is really
deceiving herself, as she seems to be, and that this logically implies
unconscious motives. On that account, apparent self-deception
would result from self-deception, and self-deception would not
only prevent the subject of being conscious of some things: it
would manage in doing so because it is motivated by unconscious
beliefs and desires. Apparent self-deception, that is, would be a
form of repression.
We can call motivational unconscious (M-unconscious) the
kind of unconscious posited by those explanations. The M-
unconscious is deﬁned by the three following constraints:
• I. It is a form of unconscious: M-unconscious states are
unconscious.
• II. It is a motivating unconscious: M-unconscious states can be
motives for actions.
• III. It is a motivated unconscious: the unconscious charac-
ter of M-unconscious states typically results from a form of
repression.
THE BASIC THEORETICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE
M-UNCONSCIOUS
The basic argument for the M-unconscious is the one I just gave.
It argues for the existence of M-unconscious states on the grounds
that they provide the best explanation of some seemingly non-
rational behaviors like self-deception. This is, roughly, Freud’s ﬁrst
argument for the unconscious in his 1915 paper The unconscious
(Freud, 1974, p. 2991–3025). Actually, even before he used the
notion of unconscious, Freud started to interpret phobias, obses-
sional compulsive disorders, and conversion disorders in terms of
self-deception, as “neuro-psychoses of defense” Freud (1974, pp.
301–313). He then explained self-deception in terms of uncon-
scious mental states and argued that M-unconscious states also
manifest themselves in other, benign, phenomena such as dreams
and lapsus.
It should be noted that even thoughFreud is probably one of the
greatest theorists of such a M-unconscious, he is neither the ﬁrst,
nor the last one. Nussbaum (1994, p. 133) convincingly argues that
Lucretius, and probably Epicurus, appealed to an M-unconscious
fear of death in order to explain some of our irrational behav-
iors. In the same vein, some contemporary psychologists have also
postulated M-unconscious states quite unlike those referred to by
Freud (Yalom, 1980 is an example). The notion of M-unconscious
is thus wider than that of the “Freudian unconscious”.
The recent fate of this notion, however, was shaped by that
of Freud’s legacy. The M-unconscious endured attacks on at least
four partially distinct fronts in the last century.
THEORETICAL OBJECTIONS
On the theoretical side, it was argued that the basic argument for
the M-unconscious is not sound. It is an abductive argument:
an argument “to the best explanation”. It argues for the exis-
tence of M-unconscious states on the ground that they provide
the best explanation of some of our behaviors. In order for such
an argument to be conclusive though, it is not enough to claim
that there are real cases of akrasia and apparent self-deception. It
must be shown that the rival explanations of the same phenom-
ena are not better. As we shall see, Jaspers (1997) already disputed
that claim, and many philosophers have recently put forward very
neat accounts of apparent self-deception which do not appeal to
unconscious states.
EMPIRICAL (AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL) OBJECTIONS
The basic argument is also a theoretical argument: it relies on
folk-psychological observations, clinical reports, and individual
narratives rather than on controlled empirical experiments. It is
moreover dubious that M-unconscious states have been directly
observed. Some have argued, in the wake of logical positivists, that
the reality of apparent self-deception and of the M-unconscious
should not accordingly be granted. It has even been argued that the
M-unconscious had not only failed to be empirically ascertained,
but also that it had to, for principled reasons. I will not, however,
consider those well known epistemological objections here.
CONCEPTUAL OBJECTIONS
Finally, it has been claimed that the very concept of M-unconscious
is inconsistent or at least very problematic and that it should be
reformed, if not eliminated (Sartre, 1976; Wittgenstein, 1982).
OUTLINE
Those attacks probably contributed to the withdrawal of the
M-unconscious from scientiﬁc psychology. Studies on the M-
unconscious were substituted by experiments focused on the
“cognitive unconscious” which is not deﬁned by its connection
to motivation but only by its unconscious character. The latter
seemed much simpler – one might say much dumber – and for
that reason much less problematic than the M-unconscious.
The face of the cognitive unconscious has however drastically
changed since Kihlstrom (1987) contrasted it with the “psycho-
analytic unconscious”. Recent developments in cognitive neuro-
sciences have shown that unconscious states are many, and that
they can occupy a wide array of functions long thought to be the
prerogative of consciousness. Not only can we perceive objects
unconsciously, we can also perceive some of the high level features
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of those objects, like the meaning of words (Dehaene and Nac-
cache, 2001). We can learn rules unconsciously (Cleeramns et al.,
1998).We canunconsciously appraise things or persons (Fazio and
Williams, 1986; Bargh et al., 1996). Some results even suggest that
self-regulation and metacognition can also occur unconsciously
(Hassin et al., 2005). In the meantime, philosophers of cognitive
science have shown that we could meet some of the difﬁculties
raised by the idea of a rich unconscious mental life, of uncon-
scious representations and so on.All this ledUleman (2005), in the
introduction of a collection of essays devoted to the topic, to con-
clude that we should now talk of the “new unconscious” and that
“the list of psychological processes carried out in the new uncon-
scious is so extensive that it raises two questions: what, if any-
thing, cannot be done without awareness? What is consciousness
for?”.
By an interesting twist of fate, this new understanding of
the cognitive unconscious has also led to an important revival
of some Freudian ideas, some researchers even claiming that
after years of neglect, the Freudian unconscious had ﬁnally been
vindicated.
The aim of this paper is to take advantage of those recent
developments to reassess the basic argument for a motivational
unconscious at a theoretical, empirical, and conceptual level. This
task is somehow too wide and I will have to restrict it by focus-
ing on the version of the basic argument that appeals to apparent
self-deception. This limitation is justiﬁed by the central role of
apparent self-deception in the motivational unconscious: repres-
sion is nothing but the way partisans of the motivational uncon-
scious explain apparent self-deception. It is also justiﬁed by the
quality and the variety of the researches that have been devoted
on this topic these last 30 years. I will ﬁrst show that the basic
argument can be rescued and developed into a cogent general the-
oretical argument for the M-unconscious. This general argument
concludes that the M-unconscious provides the best explana-
tion of apparent self-deception, or rather of what we know of
it from folk-psychological observations, psychiatric case histories,
and ﬁrst-person narratives (see Section 2).
I will then investigate some recent “empirical vindications”
of the motivational unconscious (see Section 3). Here again, I
will have to restrict my overview to three inﬂuential series of
studies that try to empirically certify the existence of apparent self-
deception in order to prove the existence of the M-unconscious.
Despite its limitation, this overview will allow us to spot some
shortcomings shared by many studies of the same vein, shortcom-
ings which explain what I take to be the rather limited success of
this “vindicating enterprise.”
Finally I will tackle what I perceive to be the two major
conceptual problems posed by the M-unconscious (see Section 4).
The outcome of this threefold review will be an original
picture of the M-unconscious which I call affective and neo-
dissociationist. According to that picture, M-unconscious states
and processes are affective states and processes that the subject
really feels and experiences – and which are in this sense conscious
– even though they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible
to him. This picture of the M-unconscious is affective in that
M-unconscious states and processes are essentially affective. It is
neo-dissociationist in that, even if M-unconscious states are in
some sense unconscious, they are in another important sense con-
scious, the role of repression being to maintain the dissociation of
two forms of consciousness rather than to expel some states from
a monolithic consciousness. Dual-process psychology and the lit-
erature on cold–hot empathy gaps partly support this version of
the M-unconscious. I argue that the latter does not only have some
empirical plausibility. It is also the only one that can escape the
two conceptual problems (see Section 5).
Those four sections are not unrelated. Indeed we will see that
the alternative explanations of apparent self-deception found in
the ﬁrst part will help in criticizing the empirical studies in the
second part, and that the conceptual problems which afﬂict the
M-unconscious will allow us to diagnose the relative failure of the
empirical vindication. I will indeed argue that the M-unconscious
must be quite unlike what we have been looking for in most
empirical studies.
1. PERSONAL LEVEL EXPLANATIONS AND THE
M-UNCONSCIOUS
Before addressing the theoretical, the empirical, and the con-
ceptual objections confronting the M-unconscious we need to
introduce some terminology and to make the deﬁnition of the
M-unconscious more articulate.
We shall see, in the next section, that there are very simple
and now very common explanations that could replace the ones
in terms of M-unconscious. The explanations I am thinking of
are framed in terms of mere “unconscious” brain states, activa-
tion levels, and neurotransmitters. They are what we might call
purely neurophysiological explanations. Such neurophysiological
explanations have been put forward to explain depression and
addiction2, and there is no reason to suppose that similar expla-
nations are not available in the case of apparent self-deception.
It is important to understand that explanations of this kind are
radically different from the ones in terms of the M-unconscious.
1.1. MOTIVES AND CAUSES
The distinction between motives and mere causes is in this respect
crucial. By citing motives, folk-psychological explanations do not
only allow to predict actions, they also“make sense”of them. They
justify them. If John desires to wound his wife and points his gun
at her, itmakes sense for him to pull the trigger. His action is in that
respect justiﬁed by his motive. By only citing causes, purely neu-
rophysiological accounts also allow to predict actions, but they
do not make sense of them3. When a judge asks you “why did
you do it?”, he is asking for motives, not for mere causes. When
a neurophysiologist asks the same question, he might be asking
for mere causes. It is in this technical sense of motivation that
M-unconscious states can be motives for action. By positing some
states which are unconscious but are motives nonetheless, expla-
nations in terms of M-unconscious accordingly prolong rather
than revise folk-psychological explanations.
2See Section 5.2.2.
3It should be emphasized that an event can causally inﬂuence the motives of a sub-
ject without ipso facto constituting a motive of the subject. The studies of Pessiglione
et al. (2007), Schmidt et al. (2010) for example show that some unconscious causes
inﬂuence our motivation, not that our motivation, in the technical sense introduced
here, can be unconscious.
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1.2. PERSONAL AND SUBPERSONAL EXPLANATIONS
It is customary, since Dennett (1969), to say that motives and
the kind of “sense-making” explanations in which they ﬁgure
belong to the personal level as opposed to the subpersonal or
even parapersonal level. This terminology reﬂects the fact that
this kind of explanation mentions states, events and processes
that we would naturally ascribe to a person. Other explanations,
on the other hand, can mention states, events or processes that
we would naturally attribute to a proper part (“sub”) of a per-
son like his brain, or to quasi-subjects (“para”) within the per-
son. Neuropsychological explanations are, for example, typically
subpersonal.
1.3. THE THREE CONSTRAINTS ON A MOTIVATIONAL UNCONSCIOUS
These distinctions can help us make the three constraints on a
M-unconscious more precise. M-unconscious states (processes,
events. . .) are not only unconscious (I). They are also motivat-
ing :
II. The M-unconscious is a motivating unconscious. M-
unconscious states can be motives of the subject’s actions, they
are states that can explain those actions at a personal level.
M-unconscious states are also typically motivated : their uncon-
scious nature results typically results from repression. Repression
in this sense includes the expulsion from consciousness of a con-
scious state as well as the “defense” processes that maintain an
unconscious state away from consciousness. Here again, it should
be insisted that repression is a personal level phenomenon that can
be compared to hiding something from someone. It is something
the subject does for a motive, hence something he does intention-
ally4. It is not a subpersonal happening, and it is not the action of
a small homunculus within the subject. As it is intentional, it is not
the mere collateral effect of some intentional actions of the subject
either.When the bombing of a bridge causes civilian losses, the lat-
ter are sometimes unintended. They are a mere collateral effect of
an intentional action. This implies that “killing civilians” is not an
intentional action but “bombing the bridge” is, even though both
expressions can be used to describe what the subject did. Repress-
ing a mental state is in that respect like bombing the bridge rather
than like killing civilians:
III. The M-unconscious is a motivated unconscious. M-
unconscious states typically result from a form of repression,
which is an intentional action of the subject5.
4By that I do not mean that it is a cautiously deliberated and reﬂected on action.
Passion crimes are intentional in my sense. Many authors have insisted that Freud
did not really mean, or at least not always, that repression is intentional (Laplanche
and Pontalis, 1968, pp. 394–395; Schacter, 2001; Gardner, 2006). I take it, however,
that they have a much more substantial understanding of “intentional”, under which
it implies a form of rationality and strategic planning (this is clear for Gardner, 2006
and Laplanche and Pontalis, 1968). Under my acceptation, which is widespread in
philosophical community, intentional, and motivated are synonymous. Any action,
be it impulsive, is intentional under some description.
5Even though Freud might have thought, like e.g., Melanie Klein, that some uncon-
scious states cannot be conscious at all, and thus cannot result from repression, the
second constraint is clearly endorsed by Freud. He says in 1923 that “we obtain
our concept of the unconscious from the theory of repression. The repressed is the
prototype of the unconscious for us (Freud, 1974, p. 3949).”
2. THEORETICAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST A
M-UNCONSCIOUS
The basic argument for a M-unconscious has been challenged,
as we said, on theoretical grounds. I will try to show that the
M-unconscious can actually withstand those criticisms quite well.
2.1. AGAINST SUBPERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF APPARENT
SELF-DECEPTION
The simplest rivals to the explanation of apparent self-deception
in terms of M-unconscious states are framed at a purely subper-
sonal level. Such explanations would provide unconscious causes
for the behaviors under scrutiny, and they would not commit
to the existence of unconscious motives. Correspondingly, they
would not try to make sense of those behaviors. The gist of
Jaspers (1997)’s early objections to Freud was precisely that the
latter had not shown the need to reject such subpersonal expla-
nations of those non-rational behaviors in favor of personal level
ones6.
Why should we favor personal level explanations? One answer
has it that personal level explanations should, when they are pos-
sible, always be favored to subpersonal explanations. It could be
claimed, for example, thatwe should by defaultmaximize the intel-
ligibility of the subjects we interpret (this is a – rather hasty – way
to understand the “principle of charity”; Davidson, 1984). In such
a bold form however, this claim is not tenable. I just remembered
a minute ago that I needed to buy some bread. Why a minute
ago rather than a minute earlier? This question has an answer in
subpersonal term. I take it however that it would in general be
totally unreasonable to look for another, complementary, answer
framed in personal terms. At least in normal circumstances, there
is just no plausible explanation of such a phenomenon in personal
terms7.
What is true is that in psychology, like everywhere, a good expla-
nation should by default save the appearances and that some of
the phenomena we are trying to explain, unlike remembering a
minute ago to buy some bread, do indeed seem to be phenomena
that can be explained in personal terms. By deﬁnition, apparently
self-deceived subjects seem to be deceiving themselves. If we want
to save this appearance wewill have to explain this phenomenon in
personal terms. Moreover, and pace eliminativism (Churchland,
1981), personal level explanations have many virtues, which might
justify that we should favor them when they are not too implausi-
ble. They have some explanatory virtues: they are simple and easy
to understand, they are also quite general and have relatively good
predictive capacities. Although it is probably more controversial, I
take it that they also have some moral virtues. They make it easier,
for example, to consider the subject as responsible of his deeds and
to empathize with him.
2.2. THE PARADOXES OF SELF-DECEPTION
Those are reasons to favor,by default at least, a personal level expla-
nationof apparent self-deception.Nowpersonal level explanations
can appeal to conscious states as well as unconscious states. Why
6Jaspers (1997) characterizes personal level explanations by the“genetic understand-
ing” they provide and he opposes them to mere causal explanations.
7I owe this example to Tim Bayne.
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shouldwe prefer unconscious states in some cases?Why shouldwe,
furthermore, appeal to repression? We outlined a basic argument
to the effect that personal level explanations of apparent self-
deception must invoke unconscious motives and repression. This
argument claims that other explanations of the same phenomenon
will lead to paradoxes. Even if their primary target was not usu-
ally the M-unconscious, in the last 40 years, philosophers of mind
have precisely articulated those paradoxes and have shown that
there are many other ways to escape them and to explain apparent
self-deception which do not appeal to unconscious states. Those
alternative solutions to the paradoxes, and the alternative expla-
nations of apparent self-deception which rely on them, threaten
the basic argument. We should accordingly review those articulate
versions of the paradoxes and assess their various solutions.
Self-deception can give rise to two paradoxes (Mele, 2001;
Davidson, 2004).
The static paradox of self-deception
1. In order to deceive someone into believing P, as opposed to
merely induce someone into believing P, one has to believe the
contrary proposition ∼P.
2. In order to be deceived into believing P one must believe P.
3. If someone believes P and believes ∼P he believes (P and ∼P).
4. So by (1–3), in order to deceive oneself into believing P, one
must believe (P and ∼P).
This is paradoxical because although apparent self-deception is
certainly irrational it does not seem so irrational as to involve the
belief in a bold contradiction.
The strategic paradox has to do with the absurdity of the project
or intention of deceiving myself rather than with the absurdity of
the state of being self-deceived.
The strategic paradox of self-deception
1. In order to deceive someone intentionally I must know (and
hence believe) that I am trying to deceive him.
2. In order for someone to be deceived by me, he must believe that
I am not trying to deceive him.
3. If I believe that I am trying to deceive myself and if I believe
that I am not, I believe that (I am and I am not trying to deceive
myself).
4. So by (1–3), in order to deceive myself I must believe that (I am
and I am not trying to deceive myself).
This is paradoxical, again, because apparent self-deception does
not seem that irrational.
The M-unconscious provides, as we said, a very natural solu-
tion to those paradoxes. When someone apparently deceives her-
self into believing P, she consciously believes P and unconsciously
believes ∼P. This solves the static paradox because one can believe
P-consciously and believe not P unconsciously without believing
(P and ∼P). Moreover, the intention of deceiving oneself must be
itself unconscious, so the subject may not believe that he has it.
This solves the strategic paradox.
According to this explanation, self-deception stems from an
unconscious motive (the intention to deceive oneself) and results
in a repressed, unconscious belief (the belief that∼P). The natural
character of this solution does not sufﬁce, however, to estab-
lish that it is the best solution to the paradoxes, and that the
M-unconscious accordingly provides the best personal level expla-
nation of apparent self-deception. There has been a considerable
amount of philosophical andpsychological theorizing on apparent
self-deception in the last 40 years andmany have proposed alterna-
tive explanations of this phenomenon that are spelled in personal
terms, but which do not appeal to unconscious states. In order to
be conclusive, the general argument for the M-unconscious must
show that those explanations are not as good as the one in terms
of M-unconscious. Reviewing those explanations will prove useful
because they provide interesting variants of the Freudian explana-
tions, variants that we should keep in mind when we will assess
the empirical evidence for the M-unconscious.
2.3. EXPLAINING APPARENT SELF-DECEPTION IN TERMS OF A
DIVIDED SELF
Ironically enough, with one notable exception (Fingarette, 1969),
the debate on apparent self-deception has largely ignored the latter
Freudian solution. It has concentrated instead on a close cousin of
it, which postulates, instead, a separation within the self between
two centers of beliefs and agency.
2.3.1. Cognitive separations and the static paradox
One can indeed solve the static paradox by postulating that the
conﬂicting beliefs are both conscious but that they are hidden to
each other by a form of separation. This involves construing the
self as divided into different centers of conscious beliefs.
2.3.2. Agentive separations and the strategic paradox
In order to get rid of the strategic paradox we must go further
and suppose that the intention to deceive, just like the belief that P
which contributes to motivate it, is also separated from the rest
of the subject. The separation will thus be agentive as well as
cognitive.
When a subject is self-deceived, a part of himself would be
deceiving another part of himself. Partisans of such a solution dis-
agree on the degree of autonomy one should grant to those parts
of the self. Rorty (1988) pictures them as full-blown homunculi.
Pears (1987) acknowledges different centers of agency but tries not
to picture them as full-blown subjects. However, the mere sugges-
tion that the self is literally divided in multiple centers of agency
is sufﬁciently awkward already. It is one thing to say that someone
has different, and maybe conﬂicting, faculties, and inclinations, it
is quite another to say that it is constituted by different centers of
agency! Davidson (1983) acknowledges the problem. He actually
takes it, wrongly I believe, to be a problem afﬂicting the Freudian
conception of the mind (Davidson, 2004, pp. 170–171). He tries
to eschew it by talking of semi-autonomous divisions or quasi-
independent structures (Davidson, 2004, p. 181) while making
clear that “the idea of a quasi-autonomous division is not one that
demands a little agent in the division” (Davidson, 2004, p. 181).
Davidson later emphasized that “the image [he] wished to invite
was not, then, that of two minds each somehow able to act like
an independent agent; the image is rather that of a single mind
not wholly integrated; a brain suffering from a perhaps temporary
self-inﬂicted lobotomy.” I think these remarks point toward the
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right direction, which is, we shall see, that of the M-unconscious
approach to self-deception, and of its neo-dissociationist variant
(see Section 6.1). The problem is that it is not clear that Davidson
has the resources to solve the strategic paradox and to endorse one
of those approaches while refusing, as he does, to be spell out more
precisely the nature of this lack of integration8 and to resort to the
concept of (un-)consciousness9.
The divided self approach to apparent self-deception is not only
metaphysically extravagant. It suffers from a deeper, seldom noted,
problem10. It cannot, by itself, explain apparent self-deception.
Suppose there are two centers of agency in someone, a deceiver
and a deceived one. The deceived center of agency has reasons
to be deceived: believing something false will alleviate his pains
and worries. But what reasons could the deceiving center have to
deceive the deceived center? By deﬁnition, two distinct centers of
agency can have independent motives for acting. Just like your
reasons for pulling the trigger are not in general reasons for me
to help you do so, the deceived center’s reasons for being deceived
will not in general be reasons for the deceiver to do the deceiving.
The partisan of the divided self approach owes us a story here, a
story which he unfortunately never provides.
It should be noted, by the way that this idea of a divided self,
an idea for which Sartre (1992) notoriously criticized Freud and
which Davidson also attributes to Freud has not been endorsed by
him11. As Gardner (2006, pp. 148–153) has argued at length,“The
ego, id, and superego, as parts of the soul, do war, but they are not
each of them warring souls.”
2.4. A FIRST DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNT: APPARENT SELF-DECEPTION
AS DIACHRONIC SELF-DECEPTION
Many philosophers have insisted that we can avoid the problems
posed by the divided self approach without espousing a Freudian
approach to apparent self-deception. They have tried to explain
this phenomenon in a deﬂationary way, that is, without positing
a present intention to deceive oneself. Some have proposed that
self-deception is actually diachronic. When I decide not to indi-
cate a future appointment in my notebook, hoping that I will
eventually forget it, I can manage to deceive myself without para-
dox because it is so to speak my present self which deceives my
8To the question “How can a person fail to put the inconsistent or incompatible
beliefs together? ” he answers “It would be a mistake to try to give a detailed answer
to this question here. The point is that people can and do sometimes keep closely
related but opposed beliefs apart (Davidson, 2004, p. 211).”
9He explicitly denies the need to do so in two places. “I see no obvious reason to
suppose one of the territories must be closed to consciousness, whatever exactly
that means, but it is clear that the agent cannot survey the whole without erasing
the boundaries (Davidson, 2004, p. 211).” “Finally, I must mention the [Freudian]
claim that many mental phenomena which normally are accessible to consciousness
are sometimes neither conscious nor easily accessible to consciousness. The reason
I have said nothing about this claim is that I think the relevant objections to uncon-
scious mental states and events are answered by showing that the theory [the theory
of apparent self-deception he defends] is acceptable without them (Davidson, 2004,
pp. 185–186).”
10Fingarette (1983) evokes this problemwhile discussing divided self interpretations
of the Freudian conception of the mind.
11“By the distinction between the“id”and the“ego,”Freud has cut the psychic whole
into two. I am the ego but I am not the id (. . .) By rejecting the conscious unity
of the psyche, Freud is obliged to imply everywhere a magic unity (Sartre, 1992,
pp. 50–53).”
future self. All cases of apparent self-deception, argue the parti-
sans of the diachronic self-deception approach, would be like that.
A subject would form the intention at time t, to deceive himself
at a future time t ’. The problem with this proposal is that at least
in some cases of apparent self-deception – let us call them cases
of severe apparent self-deception, the subject displays a form of
(synchronic) inner conﬂict. This conﬂict can be witnessed by an
equivocal behavior, as in the example of the self-deceived patient
who claims not to suffer from cancer but simultaneously avoids his
physicians. In that case as in others, the conﬂict can also surface in
abnormal emotional reactions associated with the assertion of P.
Just like liars, subjects of severe forms of apparent self-deception
can for example show heightened autonomic response when mak-
ing their claim (Bonanno et al., 1995). Diachronic accounts cannot
explain severe apparent self-deception. They do not, accordingly,
threaten the M-unconscious approach.
2.5. A SECOND DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNT: APPARENT
SELF-DECEPTION AS MOTIVATIONALLY BIASED BELIEFS
Another deﬂationary account of apparent self-deception consists
in explaining away the impression that the subject intends to
deceive himself at one point or another. There is ample empirical
evidence that our belief formation mechanisms are often biased
by our desires. Mele (1997, 2001) has argued that motivationally
biased beliefs could explain cases of apparent self-deception. Con-
sider for example a young man who recently lost his father. To
alleviate his pains, he tries to remember the good moments he
spent with him, so he focuses on situations in which his father was
very nice and he comes to forget darker aspects of his personality.
He ends up believing falsely that he was a very gentle man. Here
the belief is certainly biased by the young man’s desires. His belief
might even correspond to what he desires to be the case. But it
is better described as a case of wishful thinking than as a case of
self-deception, for the subject never had to form the intention to
believe or to forget anything. His desires biased his belief, and thus
caused it, but they did not motivate it. The belief was not formed
intentionally, to put the same point in another way, it was only a
happy collateral effect. Mele (1997, 2001) claims that all cases of
apparent self-deception are like that.
Like the preceding one, this approach cannot however account
for the inner conﬂicts which are characteristic of severe cases of
apparent self-deception. It also suffers from a speciﬁcity problem
(Bermùdez, 2000). We have many desires that do not give rise
to apparent self-deception. Theories of apparent self-deception
which appeal to the subject’s intention to deceive himself can read-
ily account for this speciﬁcity of apparent self-deception: apparent
self-deception would only arise when a subject not only desires P
or even desires to believe P, but when he also intends to believe
P. It is not obvious that the theory of apparent self-deception as
motivationally biased beliefs can give a satisfying account of the
speciﬁcity of apparent self-deception (although see Mele, 2001,
chap. 3).
2.6. THE GENERAL ARGUMENT FOR A M-UNCONSCIOUS
Having reviewed alternative approaches to self-deception and their
problems (Table 1), we are in a position to state the general
theoretical argument for the M-unconscious.
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Table 1 |The various approaches to apparent self-deception.
Category of Approach Problems
Other Subpersonal approach Does not “save the
appearances”
Substantial
approaches
Divided self approach Metaphysically extravagant,
explanatorily inadequate
(motivation)
M-unconscious approach
(repression)
Neo-dissociationist approach
Deﬂationary
approach
Diachronic self-deception Explanatory inadequate (ten-
sion)
Motivationally biased belief
(wishful thinking)
Explanatorily inadequate
(selectivity and tension)
The general theoretical argument claims that the “M-unconscious approach”
which explains apparent self-deception in terms of repression is the best. The
neo-dissociationist approach is a variant of the M-conscious approach that will be
made explicit in Section 6.1.
1. Exclusion of deﬂationary approaches. Cases of apparent self-
deception, which involve selectivity and inner conﬂict, are
better explained in a non-deﬂationary way.
2. Folk-psychological observation. Apparent self-deception
sometimes involve selectivity and inner conﬂict.
3. General explanatory principle. A case of apparent self-
deception which is better explained in a non-deﬂationary way
involves a form of motivational unconscious.
The general explanatory principle rests on the supposition that
the subjects are not too irrational [so that they cannot believe
plain contradictions like (P and not P)] and on the rejection of
the divided self and the subpersonal approaches to apparent self-
deception. The exclusion of deﬂationary approaches rests on the
fact that deﬂationary approaches of apparent self-deception,which
do not posit a present intention to deceive oneself, cannot explain
the presence of inner conﬂicts or of selectivity.
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR A M-UNCONSCIOUS
The theoretical reasons to posit a M-unconscious rely on folk-
psychological observations and on the general explanatory prin-
ciple, which depends itself on contentious methodological claims.
It would not weigh much in the face of empirical evidence to
the effect that there are no M-unconscious states. The general
argument is in that sense provisional and it would be nice if its
conclusion could be empirically conﬁrmed.
Many recent studies have been said to provide the conﬁrma-
tion needed. I will review three inﬂuential series of studies on
memory suppression, confabulation, and anosognosia for ple-
gia respectively. I will argue that they mostly miss their target.
Only the studies on anosognosia come close to vindicating the M-
unconscious, but they tend to favor a neo-dissociationist variant
of the M-unconscious approach, according to which the repressed
states are not unambiguously conscious.
3.1. MEMORY SUPPRESSION
In a much quoted study, Anderson and Green (2001) have
shown that subjects can intentionally suppress unwanted mem-
ories. Their conclusion drew on the following “think/no-think
paradigm”:
• In the ﬁrst, preliminary phase, subjects are trained to learn some
cue-target word pairs.
• In the experimental phase, which could be repeated several
times, they were shown the cue. For some words they had
to think about the target (“think” condition) while for oth-
ers they had to suppress thoughts about the target (“no think”
condition).
• In the ﬁnal phase the subject’s memory of the target associated
with each cue was assessed.
Anderson and Green (2001) have shown that the “think/no think”
instruction had a signiﬁcant effect on recall. The “think” instruc-
tion made retrieval of the target easier, while the “no think”
instruction made it harder. This effect was moreover strengthened
by the number of repetitions of the experimental phase. Encour-
aging retrieval with rewards did not affect those results. Anderson
and Green (2001, p. 303) concluded that their study “provides a
mechanistic basis for the voluntary form of repression (suppres-
sion) proposed by Freud”. Schacter (2001) noticed that this was
at least overstated, given that the targets learned and suppressed
were not emotionally loaded. The “think/no think” has however
recently been applied to targets containing negative emotional
content, showing that “when cognitive control mechanisms are
directed toward suppression, their effect on memory representa-
tions is heightened for emotional compared with neutral stimuli”
(Depue et al., 2006, 2007).
This is not,however, enough to vindicate amotivational uncon-
scious. These studies indeed show that a subject can voluntarily
forget something but they do not show that the suppressed mem-
ory remains in an unconscious form. It could have simply been
destroyed. As Kihlstrom (2002) has pointed out “there was no
evidence presented of persisting unconscious inﬂuence of the sup-
pressed items. And there was no evidence that the ‘amnesia’ could
be ‘reversed’.” Such an evidence would be however required in
order to show the existence of a motivational unconscious.
This failure has to do with the fact that memory suppres-
sion is a form of apparent self-deception which can straightfor-
wardly be explained in deﬂationary terms as a form of diachronic
self-deception, and which does not require, for that reason, the
presence of unconscious mental states.
3.2. MOTIVATED CONFABULATION
The term “confabulation” was coined in the beginning of the
century to refer to the condition of some amnesic patients who
seemed to invent, in “good faith,” narratives about themselves and
about the world, and showed little concern about the plausibility
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of their stories. In his monograph devoted to the topic, Hirstein
(2006) offers the following description of an encounter with a
confabulating patient:
A neurologist enters a hospital room and approaches an older
man sitting up in bed. The neurologist greets him, examines
his chart, and after a brief chat in which the man reports feel-
ing ﬁne, asks him what he did over the weekend. The man
offers in response a long, coherent description of his going
to a professional conference in New York City and planning
a project with a large research team, all of which the doctor
writes down. The only problem with this narration is that the
man has been in the hospital the entire weekend, in fact for
the past three months. What is curious is that the man is of
sound mind, yet genuinely believes what he is saying. When
the doctor informs him that he is mistaken, he replies, “I will
have to check with my wife about that,” then seems to lose
interest in the conversation.
A similar phenomenon has since been found to affect some
patients suffering from anosognosia for plegia, Anton syndrome,
and hemineglect. In an experimental setting, it could also affect
the patients whose corpus callosum has been severed (“split-brain”
patients). In all those cases, the situation is somehow similar.
Information coming from a given source is abnormally scarce
(short-term memory in Korsakoff ’s syndrome, proprioception in
anosognosia for hemiplegia, vision in Anton syndrome, sensory
information exchanged through the corpus callosum in split-brain
patients, etc.). When information from this source is solicited, the
patients seem to ﬁll the gaps by concocting stories.
Some have argued ﬁnally, that normal subjects are also prone
to confabulation when asked to justify an attitude the cause of
which is not normally available to introspection (Nisbett and Wil-
son, 1977; see also Bortolotti and Cox, 2009, p. 957–958, Dennett,
1992). This has led some to widen the meaning of confabulation.
We will say that while confabulation in the narrow sense can only
affect patients suffering from amnesia, confabulation in the wide
sense is associated with other pathologies as well as with normal
subjects. In this section, we will only deal with confabulation in
the narrow sense.
If explanations of confabulation commonly appeal to cogni-
tive factors, recent studies have suggested that they should invoke
motivational factors and even M-unconscious states as well.
3.2.1. Cognitive explanations
Many have noticed that classical cognitive explanations of con-
fabulations suffer from important shortcomings. It is customary
to divide cognitive explanations of mental disorders into three
categories:
• bottom-up, “empiricist” theories explain it in terms of an
experiential deﬁcit,
• top-down, “rationalist12” deﬁcits explain it in terms of an
executive function (“rationality”) deﬁcit,
12I borrow this terminology from Campbell (2001) who uses it to classify the
different accounts of delusions.
• “two-factor13” accounts explain it in terms of both kinds of
deﬁcits.
As confabulation (in the narrow sense) is connected to a memory
deﬁcit, purely rationalist accounts are implausible.We are left with
two groups of explanations. An inability to retrieve the relevant
memories or to properly situate them in time, associated with a
normal gap-ﬁlling mechanism could plausibly give rise to some-
thing like confabulation. However, it is well known that amnesia
does not always give rise to confabulation. This has led some to
postulate, in addition to the memory deﬁcit, an executive dysfunc-
tion leaving patients unable to properly assess the hypotheses they
form to ﬁll the gaps in their memories. The occurrence of such
a deﬁcit is plausible since frontal sites responsible for the cogni-
tive control and monitoring of thoughts are frequently damaged
in confabulating patients (Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Turnbull et al.,
2004). This two-factor explanation might not be entirely satis-
factory, however, since it cannot account for confabulation in the
wide sense, which does not seem to require an executive dysfunc-
tion. It might be answered that we should not expect that a single
causal mechanisms underlies all forms of confabulations. Another
problem with this account is that it resembles the so-called two-
factor explanations of delusions. It might not, accordingly, be in
a position to differentiate between delusions and confabulations
(some actually welcome this consequence; see Bortolotti and Cox,
2009, pp. 955–956).
3.2.2. Motivational inﬂuences
The objections against cognitive explanations of confabulation,
even though they might not be totally conclusive,might invite one
to look for alternative explanations. There are reasons to think that
motivational factors can also play a role in confabulation. It has
long since beenobserved that the content of confabulations is often
self-serving. This clinical observation has started to gain empirical
conﬁrmation. Using independent raters Fotopoulou et al. (2008b)
showed that confabulating patients distorted their previous expe-
riences in ways that are more pleasant than healthy and amnesic
controls (Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou et al., 2004 and Turnbull et al.,
2004 provide convergent data).
Among others, Marks Solms took the motivational account
of confabulation to vindicate some Freudian ideas (Solms, 2000;
Turnbull and Solms, 2007). It does not however vindicate the
Freudian unconscious. For all those studies show is that the false
beliefs of the confabulating patients ﬁt their desires. They con-
stitute a case of apparent self-deception. They give us no reason,
however, to think that this apparent self-deception should be
explained in terms of M-unconscious mental states rather than
in a deﬂationary way, as a form motivationally biased belief for-
mation (a form of mere wishful thinking). They do not show
that the patients have a conscious true belief that contradicts their
conscious false belief nor an unconscious motive to acquire this
conscious false belief. In order to do that, an account of con-
fabulation would have either to give direct empirical evidence of
conﬂicting unconscious mental states or, at least, to show that
13The term is from Davies et al. (2001) who coined it to describe their own account
of monothematic delusions.
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because the patients’ apparent self-deception involve selectivity
and inner conﬂict, it cannot be accounted for in a deﬂationaryway.
3.2.3. Lack of selectivity
As far as confabulation in the narrow sense is concerned, there
is no direct empirical evidence of such unconscious states avail-
able yet. Furthermore the patients’ apparent self-deception does
not exhibit the features that would rule out an explanation in
terms of a motivational bias. First, the content of confabulation
is not speciﬁc enough to suppose that it is intentional: their con-
fabulations tend to bear on their past but this can be explained by
their amnesia,which facilitates their wishful thinking on this topic.
This is indeed how Fotopoulou et al. (2008a) explain the phe-
nomenon: “both confabulation and its motivated content result
from a deﬁcit in the control and regulation of memory retrieval,
which allows motivational factors to acquire a greater role than
usual in determining which memories are selected for retrieval.
To this extent, the self-enhancing content of confabulation could
be explained as a neurogenic exaggeration of normal self-serving
memory distortion.”
3.2.4. Lack of inner conﬂict
Second, the patients do not exhibit the signs of an inner
conﬂict. Their behavior has not been shown to be ambivalent.
Hirstein (2006, p. 180) remarks that they have an hyporespon-
sive or unresponsive autonomic system and suggests that they
would not show the emotional reaction which is characteris-
tic of lying. Conjoined with the lack of selectivity this appar-
ent lack of inner conﬂict tends to show that anosognosia is
a form of facilitated wishful thinking rather than a form of
self-deception.
3.3. ANOSOGNOSIA FOR PLEGIA
Patients with anosognosia for plegia deny their paralysis. They can
also produce narratives “covering” their ailment, and thus confab-
ulate in the wide sense. They constitute an interesting case because
(i) the explanation of their pathology seems to require, like that
of confabulation in the narrow sense, the appeal to motivational
factors, (ii) but they do sometimes show signs of an inner conﬂict.
I tackle this second point ﬁrst.
3.3.1. Clinical evidence of inner conﬂicts
It has been observed clinically that many patients seem to be
somehow cognizant of their condition. Ramachandran (2009) for
example describes the following case (notice that he appeals to a
divided self approach to resolve the apparent inconsistency of the
patient):
An intelligent and lucid patient I saw recently claimed that
her own left arm was not paralyzed and that the lifeless left
arm on her lap belonged to her father who was “hiding under
the table.” Yet when I asked her to touch her nose with her
left hand she used her intact right hand to grab and raise the
paralyzed hand – using the latter as a“tool” to touch her nose!
Clearly somebody in there knew that her left arm was para-
lyzed and that the arm on her lap was her own, but “she” –
the person I was talking to – didn’t know.
Other patients seem to avoid bimanual tasks. Ramachandran also
described what he interpreted as “reaction formations” betraying
the patients’ knowledge. One of his patients for example claimed
“I can’t wait to go back to two-ﬁsted beer drinking” (Ramachan-
dran and Blakeslee, 1998, p. 139). Another wrongly claimed“I tied
the shoelace with both my hands” (Ramachandran and Blakeslee,
1998, p. 139).
3.3.2. Empirical evidence of inner conﬂicts
Several measures have been recently put forward to assess those
apparent inner conﬂicts. Marcel et al. (2004) asked patients to
estimate their bimanual abilities in the ﬁrst-person form (“In
your present state how well, compared with your normal abil-
ity, can you. . .”) and in the third-person form (“If I were in your
present state, how well would I be able to. . .”). They concluded
that 15–50% of the patients suffering from anosognosia with a
right-brain damage showed greater overestimation of their abili-
ties when asked in the ﬁrst-person rather than in the third-person.
Marcel et al. (2004) also obtained indirect acknowledgments of
the deﬁcit by asking the patients about their weak limb “in a series
of different ways (e.g., in a tentative, conﬁdential manner): “Is it
ever naughty? Does it ever not do what you want?” While most
patients suffering from anosognosia expressed incomprehension
or replied negatively, ﬁve right-brain damaged patients replied
afﬁrmatively. One patient responded conspiratorially “Oh yes! In
fact, if it doesn’t do what I want, I’m going to hit it.” As they rec-
ognize, “It is not yet clear (. . .) what the relevant aspect of [the]
question was: type of description, conﬁdentiality of interaction,
emotional tone, or infantile speech.”
Bisiach and Geminiani (1991) report that some patients may
deny their plegia while spontaneously avoiding bimanual actions
whereas others explicitly grant their plegia but spontaneously
engage in bimanual actions. Such dissociations between implicit
and explicit knowledge of plegia were recently tested by Cocchini
et al. (2010) on a group of 30 right-brain damaged patients. They
found that two patients exhibited a selective implicit anosog-
nosia and eight patients exhibited a selective explicit anosog-
nosia. Finally, Nardone et al. (2007) tested two patients using an
attentional-capture paradigm. Unlike non-anosognosic controls,
they showed a higher simple reaction time when a word related
to movement was presented with the target, suggesting again, an
implicit awareness of their deﬁcit.
There is thus consistent evidence that some patients suffering
from anosognosia, unlike patients suffering from confabulation in
the narrow sense, have conﬂicting mental states relative to their
plegia. We shall also see that, like the latter, their condition seems
to result from motivational inﬂuences.
3.3.3. The explanatory argument for motivational inﬂuences
The denial of illness is a false belief which is self-serving and prob-
ably pleasant. But this is not enough to show that it is inﬂuenced
by motivational factors for it could be self-serving so to speak,
by chance (I believe that the weather is sunny today, which is
actually conform to my desire, but there was no causal inﬂu-
ence of my desire on my belief). One reason to afﬁrm that it
is inﬂuenced by motivational factors appeals to the insufﬁciency
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of non-motivational explanations of anosognosia. Like the classi-
cal explanations of confabulation (in the narrow sense) classical,
cognitive, explanations of anosognosia divide roughly into two
groups. According to the empiricist accounts, the patient would
deny his plegia because of a proprioceptive loss, of an hemispatial
neglect, or because of a more subtle somatosensory deﬁcit, such as
an impairment of the feedforward mechanism responsible for the
monitoring and control of limbmovements (seeVuilleumier, 2004
for a review). Those empiricist theories are unsatisfactory because
double dissociations between those somatosensory deﬁcits and
anosognosia have been observed, and because, more deeply, those
somatosensory deﬁcits cannot explain why the patient maintains
his denial despite the contrary evidence that other reliable sources
(vision, testimony, etc.) keep providing14. In response some theo-
rists have proposed a two-factor theory which posits an executive
problem, such as confusion or inﬂexibility. Those executive prob-
lems would however have to be very important and many data
suggest that they are actually absent in some patients (Marcel et al.,
2004; Vuilleumier, 2004).
The insufﬁciency of both kinds of cognitive theories might
be seen as vindicating the causal role of motivational factors in
anosognosia (Levy, 2008). Even when they are conjoined with
experiential and executive deﬁcits however, motivational factors
will not be sufﬁcient to explain all cases of anosognosia. Prigatano
et al. (2010) reports for example a patient suffering from anosog-
nosia and blindness. Suffering from hemineglect, she was no more
aware of his visual experience than of her proprioceptive experi-
ence in her left hemiﬁeld. She nevertheless denied her plegia but
acknowledged her blindness. It would be ad hoc to suppose that
she had more motivations to deny her plegia than her blindness.
All this suggests that the shortcomings of traditional explanations
are often due to the fact that anosognosia is not a unitary phenom-
enon with a single underlying cause, rather than to the neglect of
motivational factors.
3.3.4. The direct argument for motivational inﬂuences
This is not to say that motivational factors do not play a role in the
explanation of some forms of anosognosia. Indeed some of the
data collected by Marcel et al. (2004, p. 33) precisely suggest that
they do. They observed, for example that “men over-estimated
their abilities on car driving more than women and only in the
ﬁrst-person version of the question.”This overestimationmight be
motivated by self-esteem, car driving abilities being more relevant
to the latter for men than for women. The following observa-
tion is also interesting in that respect. After giving the patients a
bimanual task,Marcel et al. (2004) asked them to explain their fail-
ure. It appeared that a signiﬁcant portion of patients gave bizarre
answers (e.g., “I should use a robot,” or “My arm has a cold”)
suggesting both an implicit knowledge of their handicap and “a
desperate attempt at defense against [explicit] acknowledgment”
Marcel et al. (2004, p. 34).
14Hohwy and Rosenberg (2005) and Pacherie (2008b) appeal to a form of vicious
epistemic circle to explain the ﬁxity of other delusional beliefs. The idea is that the
subject could, without irrationality, use his delusional belief in order to assess the
conﬂicting evidence. It is not obvious to me that such a strategy can generalize to
the case of anosognosia for plegia.
Let us take stock. The false beliefs of some patients with anosog-
nosia seem to arise from motivational factors. Those patients are
apparently self-deceived. Moreover, they have conﬂicting attitudes
toward their plegia, which suggests that this case of apparent
self-deception is better explained in terms of a present intention
to deceive oneself rather than in a deﬂationary way, as a form
of diachronic self-deception or as a mere motivationally biased
belief. This gives us an empirical argument for the existence of
a motivational unconscious. The force of the latter should not
be over-estimated though. It is actually a variant of the general
argument:
1. Exclusion of deﬂationary approaches. Cases of apparent self-
deception which involve selectivity and inner conﬂict are better
explained in a non-deﬂationary way.
2. Empirical observation. Anosognosia is a form of apparent
self-deception which involves an inner conﬂict.
3. General explanatory principle. A case of apparent self-
deception which is better explained in a non-deﬂationary way
involves a form of motivational unconscious.
The only difference is that the existence of the relevant case
of apparent self-deception is supported by empirical evidence
concerning anosognosia (3) whereas it is supported by folk-
psychological observations about normal behavior in the original
argument. The progress is meager given that the general princi-
ple is far more plausible in the case of normal behavior than it
is in the case of anosognosia. The general explanatory principle,
it should be reminded, rests on the assumption that subjects are
rational enough to detect obvious inconsistencies between their
conscious attitudes. It is not obvious, however, those patients
who suffer from anosognosia and are relevantly self-deceived –
those who exhibit a form of inner conﬂict – satisfy this rationality
assumption.
More fundamentally, the general explanatory principle rests
on various premises that might be deemed controversial and we
should expect an empirical conﬁrmation to give us independent
support for its conclusion. It rested, for example, on the claim
that apparently self-deceived patients seem to be deceiving them-
selves and that we should by default save this appearance. Such
premises, again would not weigh much against some empirical
evidencewhich favors alternative explanations of the apparent self-
deception afﬂicting the patients. Some inﬂuential researchers have
indeed argued for such alternative explanations. Hirstein (2006)
has argued for an explanation in subpersonal terms. Marcel et al.
(2004) have argued for an explanations in personal but conscious
terms. I will argue that if the empirical evidence gathered so far
seems to exclude Hirstein’s account, it also seems to favor Marcel’s
neo-dissociationist account over those which picture the repressed
states as unambiguously unconscious.
3.3.5. Subpersonal self-deception?
Hirstein (2006) has claimed that cases of apparent self-deception
in patients suffering from anosognosia could be explained with-
out having to postulate that the subject knows about his plegia and
intends to forget about it. Hirstein’s point rests mainly on the fact
that the selectivity of the patient’s confabulations can be explained
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without positing an intention to deceive oneself (Hirstein, 2006, p.
230) and on the patients’ attenuated autonomic response, which
would betray an absence of inner conﬂict. Although he does not
address the issue,Hirstein could countenance someof the evidence
we have reviewed so far, which indicates a form of inner conﬂict,
by claiming that even though some parts of the patient’s brain rep-
resent his plegia and control his belief that he is healthy, the subject
himself, as opposed to his brain, does not believe, unconsciously
or otherwise, that he suffers from a paralysis and does not intend,
consciously or otherwise to believe that he is healthy. He could
claim, in other words, that the patient’s “deceptive intention” and
“knowledge” are subpersonal.
3.3.6. Conscious self-deception?
I take it, however, that the results of Marcel et al. (2004) support
the claim that some patients do represent their condition at a per-
sonal level. They show that the patients can, when they are asked
in the proper way, report their handicap (cf. Levy, 2008, pp. 235–
238). Those striking results, however, tend to show toomuch. They
tend to show not only that the patients have genuine personal level
attitudes toward their plegia, but also that they have conscious atti-
tudes toward their plegia. They tend to show, more precisely that
the patients consciously believe that they are paralyzed. After all,
reportability is a good enough evidence for consciousness! Marcel
and his colleagues accordingly opt for an interpretation of appar-
ent self-deception among patients suffering from anosognosia in
terms of conscious self-deception:
Some patients seemed to show a genuine dissociation within
awareness according to the manner or viewpoint of the ques-
tion. Such a split in consciousness, often referred to as a
dissociative state,has been said tooccur in a variety of circum-
stances. (Marcel et al., 2004, p. 33)
Such an option might seem problematic because other measures
reveal that the patients consciously believe that they are not par-
alyzed. Marcel et al. (2004, p. 33) suggests that this “is only a
problem if we assume a strict singularity of consciousness and a
logical consistency within any one segment of consciousness. That
is, genuine dissociations and conﬂicts within awareness may be
possible. (Marcel et al., 2004, p. 33).” I will come back to the ques-
tion of the “strict singularity of consciousness” when we will put
forward a neo-dissociationist approach to self-deception, accord-
ing to which repressed state are in some important sense conscious
even though they are not well accessible to the subject for ratio-
nal control (see Sections 6.1–6.2). For now, it is enough to realize
that the patients could simply fail to be rational enough to mon-
itor their inconsistencies and that they could accordingly believe
consciously both that they do and that they do not suffer from a
paralysis.
4. CONCEPTUAL OBJECTIONS TO A M-UNCONSCIOUS
It might be no accident that two leading groups of researchers
who recognize the conﬂicting nature of some forms of anosog-
nosia nevertheless reject an explanation of this conﬂict in terms
of unconscious personal level states. Doing so, they implicitly get
round two conceptual objections that make the very notion of a
motivational unconscious problematic. I will actually argue that
if those two objections do not make M-unconscious states impos-
sible, they make it at least quite different from what we have been
looking for through most empirical studies. They would thus also
contribute to explain why the empirical studies we have scruti-
nized have not provided some decisive evidence for a motivational
unconscious.
Those two conceptual objections are related with the second
and the third constraint on a motivational unconscious respec-
tively. They rely on the tension between those and the ﬁrst con-
straint. The ﬁrst objection claims that personal level mental states
like motives must necessarily be conscious (see Section 4.1). The
second objection claims that one could not repress a mental state
unless he is conscious of that state, so that repression is a priori
impossible (see Section 4.2). In that section, I will review those
two objections and some answers to them that I deem inadequate.
I will then put forward my own neo-dissociationist answer.
4.1. A FIRST CONCEPTUAL OBJECTION: CAN PERSONAL LEVEL
STATES BE UNCONSCIOUS?
Typical personal level mental states are conscious (at least as far
as occurrent mental states are concerned). Typical unconscious
brain states are not personal level mental states. Some researchers
have suggested that unconscious mental states of a personal level
would simply be chimerical. Wittgenstein for example considered
that personal level accounts could only explain our actions by pro-
viding motives or reasons for them (he often seems to assimilate
motives and reasons) and that unconscious mental states could
not provide such motives or reasons for our actions but only mere
causes for them15. Jaspers (1997) also considered that unconscious,
as opposed to merely “unnoticed,” mental states could not ﬁgure
in personal level explanations16.
4.1.1. Challenging the conscious-unconscious distinction
Even if it were acknowledged that somepersonal levelmental states
could be unconscious, there would still be a problem of criterion.
On what ground should we judge that an unconscious state is a
personal level mental state? Consciousness and reportability are
the most common and the most natural criteria for the personal
level, but those are useless when it comes to assess the existence
of unconscious personal level mental states. Levy (2008) argues at
length that the empirical evidence supports the claim that patients
suffering from anosognosia really do “acknowledge,” at a personal
level, their plegia. To counter Hirstein (2006)’s contention that this
“acknowledgment” is only subpersonal because it is not available
to them, he has to argue that availability comes in degree and
that this acknowledgment is somehow available to them. The idea
15“The difference between a reason and a cause is brought out as follows: the inves-
tigation of a reason entails as an essential part one’s agreement with it, whereas the
investigation of a cause is carried out experimentally. (. . .) Of course the person
who agrees to the reason was not conscious at the time of its being his reason. But
it is a way of speaking to say the reason was subconscious. (. . .) It is a confusion to
say that a reason is a cause seen from the inside. A cause is not seen from within or
from without. It is found by experiment (Wittgenstein, 1982, p. 11).”
16Unlike Wittgenstein who seemed to believe that reasons or motives could not be
causes Jaspers believed that personal level explanations were also causal explana-
tions. Both agreed however that unconscious mental states could only provide the
mere causes of an action, and never “make sense” of it.
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seems to be that at a certain level of availability we can say that
the patient has some consciousness of his condition and that he
accordingly acknowledges it at a personal level even though he is
not fully conscious of it. I think that this is actually a good strat-
egy, and we shall see that a defender of the M-unconscious might
have to adopt a similar neo-dissociationist strategy, arguing that
M-unconscious state are not totally unconscious. But unless more
is said, it might seem like an ad hoc maneuver to counter the claim
of those who contend that either a state is sufﬁciently available to
the subject to be a personal level state, and it is conscious, or it is
not but it is unconscious. We will come back to that point later
(see Section 5.4.2).
4.1.2. Challenging the personal-subpersonal distinction
Alternatively, instead of making the border between the con-
scious and the unconscious murkier, one might try to challenge
the distinction between personal and subpersonal mental states.
Bermúdez (2000) has for example argued that personal level expla-
nations are not autonomous in that some subpersonal levelmental
states can, and should ﬁgure, in some explanations that “make
sense” of an action. He mentions, among others, explanations of
the behavior of blindsights (Weiskrantz, 1986), or explanations of
skillful behavior (some subpersonal motor processes can explain
why the tennis champion managed to put the ball just here and
not a few inches further, behind the line; see also Pacherie, 2008a).
I agree with the general claim that some subpersonal states can
ﬁgure in explanations that make sense of an action. I am not
sure however, that such subpersonal states can, in those explana-
tions, play the role of M-unconscious states. In particular, if the
notion of M-unconscious is consistent, there should be some M-
unconscious intentions capable alone of making sense of some
actions, namely, the intentions to deceive oneself. It is dubious,
however, that subpersonal intentions can alone, make sense of
actions, or even that there can be such a thing as a subpersonal
intention (an intention of whom?). This brings us to the second
conceptual problem.
4.2. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE M-UNCONSCIOUS: IS IT
POSSIBLE TO REPRESS AN UNCONSCIOUS STATE?
We saw that the notion of M-unconscious allow us to solve the
paradoxes of self-deception. It is however exposed to what one
might call a “revenge problem17”. The problem, to put it brieﬂy, is
that in order to act on something intentionally I must be conscious of
the thing I act on. Otherwise I could not have a sufﬁcient control of
that thing for my action to count as intentional. This is true even
if we understand, as we do,“intentional” in a minimal sense which
does not involve anything like deliberations. When John shoots
his wife in anger, if his action is intentional, he must be conscious
of his wife and of the fact that she is in a position to be shot. In
17Sartre (1976, p. II) famously argued that the unconscious posited by Freud was
thwarted by some kind of a revenge problem. However, the revenge problem he
delineated depends on the problematic assumption that Freud adopted a divided
mind approach to apparent self-deception, and it is accordingly misses its target.
Drawing on Sartre and on Freud himself, Fingarette (1983) addresses an objection
to Freud’s classical theory of the unconscious which is quite close to the one I frame
in that subsection.
the same way, if I close the door of a conference I am attending to
and that in doing so I prevent a very noisy man from entering the
room, we will not say that I intentionally prevented this man from
entering unless I was aware of this man. More generally, if I am not
conscious of X and X happens because of me, then it happens so
to speak “blindly” rather than intentionally: as a consequence of
some automatic, subpersonal process in me, or as a mere collateral
effect of some other thing that I do intentionally. This principle of
conscious agency connecting intentional action and consciousness
applies to repression. It yields that the subject must be conscious
of the states he represses, which contradicts the claim that they are
unconscious. This revenge problem18 is, I take it, the fundamental
problem of the motivational unconscious. If M is a typical M-
unconscious state, an M-unconscious state, that is, which results
from repression,
1. The repression of M is intentional (The M-unconscious is a
Motivated Unconscious)
2. In order to repress something intentionally one must be
conscious of that thing (Principle of conscious agency)
3. The subject is not conscious of M19 (The M-unconscious is
unconscious)
(1) and (3) are deﬁnitional. (2), the principle of conscious
agency, is widely endorsed by psychologists who consider inten-
tional control as a measure of consciousness (Debner and Jacoby,
1994). It has been defended on intuitive grounds: intentional
actions, as opposed to automatic behaviors and mere collat-
eral effects must not be “blind”. Here is a more cautious argu-
ment connecting consciousness and action through the notion of
control:
• If a subject acts intentionally on X, X must be under his
intentional control.
• If X is under the intentional control of a subject, that subject
must be conscious of X.
18This revenge problemactually stems fromawhatmight be considered a third para-
dox of self-deception. This third paradox, which I have called the agentive paradox
elsewhere (Billon, unpublished) goes as follows:
1. In order to repress someone’s belief intentionally I must be able to control this
belief.
2. In order to control the belief of someone I must be aware of the fact that he has
this belief.
3. So in order to repress one of my beliefs intentionally I must be aware of the fact
that I have the belief.
This paradox, like the others will not be solved by the claim that the subject is
divided between various centers of agency, for such a division makes the motiva-
tion for repressing the belief mysterious (see Section 2.3.2). If the M-unconscious
provides a solution to the ﬁrst two paradoxes of self-deception, the latter seems
thwarted by this agentive paradox.
19There is actually a small loophole for one might be conscious of a mental state
without being conscious of being in that state. This seems to happen for example, in
patients suffering from thought insertion (Billon, forthcoming). I take it, however,
that to repress a sate intentionally, one must be not only conscious of that state but
also of being in that state. Moreover, standard cases of repression (unlike maybe
so-called “projections”) do not involve the misattribution of a mental state.
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5. AN AFFECTIVE, NEO-DISSOCIATIONIST PICTURE OF THE
M-UNCONSCIOUS
If the concept of M-unconscious is to be consistent, the argument
(1–3) which has it that M-unconscious states are both conscious
and unconscious must rest on an equivocation. This hypothesis
is indeed quite plausible. Consciousness is a famously ambiguous
and slippery notion (Chalmers, 1996; Siewert, 1998; Block, 2004).
As Block (2004) puts it, “there are a number of very different
“consciousnesses”. (. . .) These concepts are often partly or totally
conﬂated, with bad results.” The fundamental problem of the M-
unconscious might be one of those “bad results.” It could indeed
be escaped if “conscious” did not have the same meaning in (2)
and in (3). Considering that consciousness and agency are related
by the principle of conscious control, distinctions in forms of con-
sciousness are likely to mirror distinctions in forms of intentional
control of agency. I will indeed argue that we should distinguish
phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness on the one
hand (Section 5.1) and impulsive and rational forms of inten-
tional control on the other hand (Section 5.2). Repression is, I will
argue, an impulsive process, and repressed states are conscious in
the phenomenal sense even if the subject is not access-conscious
of them and cannot accordingly control them rationally. This will
allow us to solve the fundamental problem of the M-unconscious.
We shall see that this will allow us to solve the ﬁrst conceptual
problem as well.
5.1. THE AMBIGUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
5.1.1. Access-consciousness (A-consciousness)
One of the difﬁculties surrounding the task of deﬁning conscious-
ness is that the word applies to different kinds of thing. We can
talk of
• conscious creatures (this man is conscious),
• of conscious mental states (his perception of the grass is
conscious),
• and of conscious contents (he is conscious of the grass).
As the example makes clear those senses are related. In particular a
subject is conscious of R if he has a conscious state with the content
R. The risk of confusion is even bigger when the conscious content
is itself a mental state, like when I am conscious of my desire to
go to the sea, for in that case the desire which is a conscious con-
tent can also be a conscious state. In order to avoid ambiguities,
I will always use the locution “conscious of” to refer to conscious
contents.
Consider now a perceptual state which represents that the grass
is green in front of me. We can say that this perceptual state is
conscious (or that I am conscious of the grass being green) to
mean that I can report that the grass is green, that I can reason
on this fact and infer that it rains often in this part of the country,
etc. This sense of consciousness underlies reportability. It is called
A-consciousness.
Access-consciousness (A-consciousness) If a subject S has a state
X which represents R, we say that X is A-conscious, or that S is A-
conscious of R, if R is broadcast for free use in the rational control
of behavior (I adapt this deﬁnition from Block, 2004).
A-consciousness marks a degree of availability, or a quality of
access. We can indeed classify degrees of availability depending on
the kind of behavior the available information can yield:
a. Minimally available information. An information is minimally
available, when it is only represented at a subpersonal level and
does not normally inﬂuence the subject’s overt behavior. Brain
potentials reveal that patients suffering from prosopagnosia
covertly recognize faces (Renault et al., 1989), this recognition
however seems to be, at least in certain patients, only minimally
accessible (Bruyer, 1991).
b. Subliminal information1.At a higher degree of accessibility, the
information inﬂuences the subject’s behavior in subtle ways.
One can think for example of the priming effects of masked
stimuli (Marcel, 1983; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Kouider
et al., 2006).
c. Subliminal information 2. At a slightly higher degree, the
subject can report the information in forced choice situa-
tions (think of the visual information available to blindsights;
Weiskrantz, 1986).
d. Subliminal information 2’. The informationmight also be avail-
able in such a way that although the subject cannot report it
spontaneously, he could have done so if his attention had not
been impeded. This is the case of stimuli which are shown dur-
ing an attentional blink (Sergent and Dehaene, 2005; Dehaene
et al., 2006 calls such subliminal stimuli preconscious).
e. Non-categorical spontaneous report. The information might
be available in such a way that the subject can spontaneously
report it but only in a non-categorical way. For example, a
subject who feels depressed might be unable to categorize his
feeling as depression and yet be able to discriminate when this
feeling changes or disappears.
f. Categorical spontaneous report. At a higher level, the subject is
also able to categorize the information.
g. Memory. To store it in memory.
h. Predicting and planning. And to use it for making predic-
tions, for planning, etc. The typical supraliminal perception
of “medium sized dry goods” for example allows to do all those
things.
The degree of availability to whichA-consciousness corresponds is
the degree of availability which allows rational control. In Blocks’s
ofﬁcial deﬁnition “The “rational” is [just] meant to rule out the
kind of automatic control that obtains in blindsight (Block, 2004),”
so rational control and A-consciousness would probably start at
(e). For reasons that will appear later20, I think it is better to under-
stand “rational” in a more substantial sense, and to consider that
A-consciousness and the kind of rational control that character-
izes it start at (f). It will be useful to give a name to the kind of
20In a nutshell, the principle of conscious agency reveals a conceptual connection
between consciousness and intentional control. We will see that the category of
intentional control divides in two subcategories: impulsive and rational control.
The distinction between two forms of consciousness seems to mirror that dis-
tinction between two forms of intentional control, but in order to acknowledge
this, we must adopt this more substantial reading of “rational” in the deﬁnition of
A-consciousness.
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rational control and A-consciousness involved in normal supral-
iminal perceptions (h): we will say that the, subjects are robustly
A-conscious of their contents and that he can use the information
they provide for highly rational control.
5.1.2. Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness)
Whatever the precise degree of availability it requires, A-
consciousness will conceptually differ from phenomenal con-
sciousness (P-consciousness). My phenomenally conscious states
are those states there is something it is like to be in (Nagel,
1974), those states that have a subjective or a qualitative char-
acter. They are what we call subjective experiences. While access-
consciousness is tied to rationality, phenomenality is tied affectiv-
ity21. It should be noted however, that even if affects and emotions
are paradigmatic of phenomenal states, perceptions, episodes of
inner speech are also phenomenally conscious. Some have even
argued that abstract thoughts could be conscious in this sense as
well (Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004). Just like for A-consciousness we
can attribute P-consciousness both to states and to their contents.
Thus, if a subject has a subjective experience X of R we can say that
he is P-conscious of R or that X is P-conscious.
Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) We say that a sub-
ject’s mental state is P-conscious if it is a subjective experience.
We say that subject S is P-conscious of R if he has a subjective
experience of R.
It has often been noted that because of their subjectivity, P-
conscious states seemed to involve a form of implicit or marginal
reﬂexivity (Kriegel, 2004). What it’s like to have an experience is
always what it’s like for me to have an experience because, to put it
simply, I experience my subjective experiences. In what follows it
will be useful to remember this suggestion to the effect that we are
indeed always P-conscious of our P-conscious states, be it in am
implicit and marginal manner.
5.1.3. The (un-)consciousness of M-unconscious states
We can now come back to the fundamental problem of the M-
unconscious. In what sense should “unconscious” be taken in
(3). In what sense should a subject be unconscious of his M-
unconscious states. If a subject has an M-unconscious state M, he
should be unable to report M. More broadly, he should be unable
to use the information that he is in M for taking rational decisions.
The subject should accordingly be A-unconscious of M. We can
thus rephrase (3) as:
3’. S is A-unconscious of M (M-unconscious is unconscious)
If we are to defuse the second conceptual objection we must
show that there is a sense of consciousness, say consciousness∗,
such that
i. consciousness∗ is a formof consciousness in an intuitive sense.
ii. if S is conscious∗ of M, M is under his intentional control.
21Here again, even though I literally accept Block’s ofﬁcial deﬁnition, I inter-
pret it in a slightly different manner by insisting on the connection between
P-consciousness and affectivity. This is quite commonsensical I suppose, as wit-
nessed by the common idea that what phenomenally unconscious creatures, like
robots, would paradigmatically lack is emotions (Spielberg, 2001).
iii. S can be conscious∗ of M without being A-conscious of M. S
can be conscious∗ of M, that is, without M being under his
rational control.
(iii) seems to stand in tension with (ii) and (i). I will argue
that this tension is only apparent and that we have independent
reasons to believe that P-consciousness can satisfy (i–iii). I will
indeed show that there is an important distinction between two
forms of intentional control that mirrors the distinction between
A-consciousness and P-consciousness:
• There is a form of control, impulsive control, that is intentional
without being rational.
• This intentional form of control is associated, as the princi-
ple of conscious agency requires, with a form of consciousness,
namely P-consciousness.
• A subject can be P-conscious of something he is not A-
conscious of.
In the picture that will emerge, M-unconscious states are typically
affective states that the subject experiences viscerally even though
he is not A-conscious of them. He can control them impulsively,
but not rationally and repression is thus an impulsive process.
5.2. THE AMBIGUITY OF INTENTIONAL CONTROL
Why should we posit sub-rational forms of intentional control?
According to a tradition that can be traced back to Hume and
that has been, at least until recently, quite dominant, all inten-
tional actions suppose a formof rational control.Doing something
intentionally is doing it for a reason, and the intention of the
action is precisely the reason for carrying it. In other words, all our
motives or intentions would be equally rational. Such a rationality
of intentional actions presupposes that we always chose the action
which satisﬁes our dearest desires, the one, that “maximizes our
preferences.” This Humean conception of motivation and action is
shared by classical rational choice theory,by classical cognitive psy-
chology and by the very inﬂuential writings of Donald Davidson
on action.
5.2.1. The problem of impulsivity
The Humean conception is confronted, however, with what one
might call the problem of impulsivity. Consider a drug addict who
sincerely desires to stop taking drugs, but nevertheless goes and
gets one more dose. He seems to be acting intentionally against his
best reasons. He might even explicitly realize that what he is doing
goes against his dearest desires and his interest. If this is indeed a
correct description of his behavior, then some impulsive actions
are intentional actions which are not carried for a reason. They are
intentional actions which do not involve rational control22.
5.2.2. Dissolving the problem of impulsivity
Confronted with the problem of impulsive actions researchers
have adopted three different stances. Some have tried to dissolve
22As already noted it is traditional to distinguish impulsivity from akrasia in the
strict sense. Akratic actions, it is said, can supposedly be done cold-bloodedly. I
agree that some akratic actions seem cold-blooded. I am not sure however that they
really are so and I tend to be skeptical about this distinction.
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the problem by claiming that appearances notwithstanding,
“impulsive actions” are either rational or not actions at all. With
respect to addictive behaviors both variants of this “dissolutionist
answer” have been defended. The economist (and Nobel prize
winner) Gary Becker has for example claimed that addictive
behavior could, under certain hypotheses, be explained within
the framework of rational choice theory (Yaffe, 2001). At the
other end of the spectrum, some neuroscientists have claimed
that addiction is “nothing but” a brain disease and that addic-
tive behaviors has to be understood in subpersonal terms, as
automatic happenings, rather than in personal terms, as genuine
actions of the subject (Leshner, 1997). Both variants are unsat-
isfying. Against Becker, drug-addicts often experience an inner
conﬂict, which the theory of “rational addiction” does not, and
probably cannot, account for. Against the theory of addiction as
a brain disease, addictive behaviors do indeed exhibit the fea-
tures of intentional actions. First, the subject does not behave
automatically, he has some control over his behavior, in only of
a limited form. As Mele (2004) emphasizes, there are always some
motives that could prevent someone from carrying a given impul-
sive action. If a drug-addict is seriously threatened, say with a
gun, or if he has to brave his biggest phobia to get a dose, he
will normally refrain from going and getting it. Second, and
relatedly, even if the subject cannot react rationally to it, he is
conscious of the craving that moves him. Cravings are indeed par-
adigmatically things one experiences, things that are P-conscious
(they might also be A-conscious, but we shall see that this is not
necessary).
5.2.3. Solving the problem of impulsivity by renouncing the
Humean theory of motivation
The problem of impulsivity should then invite us to reject the
Humean theory of motivation and opt for what we might call
a Platonic conception of motivation23 According to such a the-
ory, motivation is not monolithic. It has actually two distinct
dimensions, which correspond to two forms of control and which
are connected, as required by the principle of conscious agency, to
two forms of consciousness (Table 2):
• Rational actions, or actions made for a reason, are controlled by
rational evaluation which rely on A-conscious reasons.
• Impulsive actions, are controlled by visceral or affective appraisal
which rely on P-conscious affects or visceral factors.
Such a theory revives the classical distinction between reason
and passions, volitions and inclinations or desires and drives. It
has been defended against the dominant Humean conception by
a few philosophers (Watson, 1975; Schapiro, 2009). It has overall
been promoted by studies in neuroeconomy. In his seminal work,
Loewenstein (1996) has urged to dissociate rational from visceral
23For lack of space, I will neglect what might be called the “minimal solution” to
the problem of impulsivity. The minimal solution tries to solve problem by mod-
ifying the rational choice theory but without renouncing the Humean theory of
motivation as such. Such a solution is associated with the works of George Ainslie,
it explains impulsive action by a form of hyperbolic discount of the future (Ainslie,
1975, see Yaffe, 2001; for a short introduction and critique of the theory).
Table 2 |The Platonic conception of motivation.
Intentional actions Automatic behaviors
Actions for
a reason
Impulsive
actions
Personal level Personal level Subpersonal level
E.g., singing, sitting-
down
E.g., Phobic reaction,
addictive behavior
E.g., digestion, sneezing
Require
A-consciousness
Require P-conscience Do not require conscious-
ness
Some intentional actions are not made for a reason, they are accomplished
impulsively. Being intentional actions, they require a form of consciousness,
but unlike rational actions which require A-consciousness, they only require
P-consciousness.
factors in the explanation of actions. The later are deﬁned by their
direct hedonic impact, and their direct inﬂuence on our behavior.
They are very little sensitive to reasons and can have dispropor-
tionate effects. These analyses have recently been conﬁrmed by the
discovery of two neuroanatomically distinct systems responsible
for rational and visceral decisions respectively (Sanfey et al., 2003,
2006).
5.3. P-CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT A-CONSCIOUSNESS
We could then solve the second conceptual problem by claiming
that repression is an intentional action of the subject which is
impulsive and non-rational. He can control a state M he represses
because he experiences it, because he is P-conscious of it. As P-
conscious states are subjective,which implies, aswe saw,an implicit
reﬂexivity, he might even be P-conscious of M just in virtue of the
fact that M is itself P-conscious.
For that solution to work, however, we would have to claim that
although he experiences it, he is not A-conscious of it. Some might
object that one can always report his experiences and that one
cannot accordingly be P-conscious of something without being A-
conscious of it. In a series of publications,Ned Block has defended
that “P-consciousness overﬂows A-consciousness” (Block, 2001,
2005, 2007). His arguments rest on sophisticated conceptual and
methodological considerations (Block, 2007). A simpler, and quite
commonsensical, argument is available to us24.
5.3.1. Diffuse feelings
When I experience something, I feel it, for sure, but what I feel
might not be enough to allow the rational control of my behavior.
Consider a case in which you are diffusely anxious because (say)
you will be undertaking a big voyage soon. You experience this
diffuse anxiety and if it suddenly went away, you would notice a
change. In that sense, you can report this anxiety, connected with
your imminent travel. But youmight be unable report it under that
mode of presentation, categorically that is. You might be unable
to tell that you feel anxious (categorical recognition), let alone
24This commonsensical argument might be unavailable to Block because, as we
noted (see Section 5.1.1), he understands A-consciousness in a slightly more
inclusive way.
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that this anxiety is caused by your apprehension of an imminent
voyage (etiological recognition). You might accordingly be totally
unable to use what you experience for the rational control of your
actions. This contrasts drastically from cases of regular supralim-
inal P-conscious perceptions of medium sized dry goods. When
you P-consciously perceive R, you can normally recognize that
your conscious state is a perception of R (categorical recognition)
and that it is caused by R (etiological recognition). This is why our
perceptions can normally feed the rational, and indeed, the highly
rational, guidance of our actions.
Such subjective experiences of which the subject is not A-
conscious might be quite widespread. In an important article,
Lambie and Marcel (2002) devote many pages to such situations
which they characterize as situations of emotion experience with-
out second-order awareness (this terminology is consistent with
mine: the A-consciousness of an emotion is a form of second-
order awareness, for emotions are mental states). They describe
a few case reports involving people apparently unable to report
their fear experience but they also note that the empirical data on
“repressors” (Weinberger, 1990) and on alexithymia (Lane et al.,
1997) might be interpreted as evidence for their claim. More to the
point, on Clark (1986)’s inﬂuential account, panic attacks would
result from an inability of the subject to be A-conscious of the
anxiety he experiences. Unable to categorize it as such, the subject
wouldmistake its bodily effects for the symptoms of an illness or of
a heart attack. Lambie and Marcel (2002) also remark that patients
with “anger disorders” (Kassinove and Sukhodolsky, 1995), who
show high or chronic levels of anger “often feel in some sense that
“the world is against them”, and (. . .) many of them lack awareness
of their anger (Eckhardt and Deffenbacher, 1995), and are having
treatment only because employers or loved ones have encouraged
them to do so (Lambie and Marcel, 2002).” Drawing on the cog-
nitive treatments of anger disorders, they claim that the patients
experience a form of anger which they are not A-conscious of.
They conclude, strikingly, that “there is every reason to suppose
that the same occurs for a range of other emotions as for anger.
The only reason that unrecognized anger is highlighted is that its
effects cause other people to make the individual see a therapist.
Unrecognized happiness or love does not have the same effect
(Lambie and Marcel, 2002).”
5.3.2. Cold–hot empathy gaps as affect blindness
These difﬁculties to become A-conscious of some P-conscious
states that we experience seem to be linked to the fact that those
P-conscious states are hot, visceral, affective, P-conscious states –
they are some of those states that are paradigmatically P-conscious
and that motivate impulsive actions. There is indeed ample evi-
dence,quite generally, that their hot charactermakes those affective
states indistinct and little visible to A-consciousness. Even when
we can categorically recognize and report some of those states, it
appears that we cannot remember them well nor use them well
for making predictions and planning. In other words, even when
we are A-conscious of them, our A-consciousness of them is not
of a robust form. The availability of the information they provide
tends not to be good enough to serve highly rational reactions. It
has been shown that we systematically underestimate the impact
of visceral factors in our decisions and in our explanations and
our predictions of behavior. Loewenstein (1996, pp. 277–278) for
example reports that when asked to make a non-binding choice,
expectant women tend to state a desire to eschew anesthesia but
reverse their decision when they start to experience pain. “The
reversal of preference, he notes, was observed not only for women
giving birth for the ﬁrst time, but also those who had previously
experienced the pain of childbirth; experience does not seem to
go very far in terms of enhancing one’s appreciation for future
pain.” Such “cold–hot empathy gaps” have since then been found
in a variety of situations, in intrapersonal and interpersonal set-
tings, regarding past, present as well as imagined affects (Wilson
andGilbert, 2003; Loewenstein, 2005;VanBoven and Loewenstein,
2005).
We could summarize those ﬁndings on empathy gaps by saying
that just as our P-conscious affective appraisals are little sensitive
to A-conscious reasons, conversely, our A-conscious rational eval-
uations are not highly sensitive to our P-conscious affects. This
ﬁnding is important because it tends to make of A-consciousness
and rational evaluations on the one hand, and of P-consciousness
and affective appraisals on the other hand two partly indepen-
dent psychological systems: a cold system and a hot systems that
have different ways of learning (Phelps, 2005), different dynam-
ics, and different functions. The partial independence of those
systems explains many of our irrational behaviors, and in par-
ticular, our tendency to repeat the same mistakes without ever
seeming to learn from experience (Gilbert, 2006). They could
account, very broadly, for what Haybron (2008) has called the
(widespread)“pursuit of unhappiness”. This ﬁnding,ﬁnally, echoes
many developments in the so-called dual-process psychology
Evans (2008), not to mention Freud’s distinction between primary
and secondary processes.
5.4. THE AFFECTIVE M-UNCONSCIOUS
Let us take stock. We saw that the notion of M-unconscious is
faced with two conceptual problems. We saw that the second of
these problems,which we dubbed the fundamental problem of the
M-unconscious could indeed be solved thanks to the distinction
between two forms of intentional agency and two correlated forms
of consciousness.
5.4.1. The affective M-unconscious and the fundamental problem
of the M-unconscious
With these distinctions in mind we can indeed rephrase the funda-
mental problemof theM-unconscious as an argument to the effect
that M-unconscious states must be P-conscious states the subject
is not A-conscious of, which result from an impulsive repression,
and which are probably hot affective states (Figure 1):
1. The repression of M is intentional (The M-unconscious is a
motivated unconscious)
2. If a subject represses a state intentionally, he must be conscious
of that state (Principle of conscious agency)
• If a subject represses a state intentionally he represses it either
for a reason or impulsively (The ambiguity of intentional
control)
• If one represses a state for a reason, he must be A-conscious
of that state (Rational control and A-consciousness)
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FIGURE 1 |The affective understanding of the M-unconscious.
M-unconscious thoughts are affective P-conscious thoughts. Repression,
which prevents the subject from being A-conscious of those thoughts, is
itself a P-conscious, impulsive process of which the subject is not
A-conscious.
• If one represses a state impulsively, he must be P-conscious
of that state (Impulsive control and P-consciousness)
3. The subject is not A-conscious of M (The M-unconscious is
unconscious)
3′. The subject must be P-conscious of M but not A-conscious of
M, and the repression must be impulsive [from (2) and (3)]
4. If the subject is P-conscious of M but not A-conscious of M
and the repression is impulsive, M is probably a hot affective
state [from (3’) and the data on states of which the subject is
P-conscious but not A-conscious].
As an example we can return to the case of the Mary who
deceived herself into believing that she is not suffering fromcancer.
According to this affective understanding of the M-unconscious,
she would experience some intense fear of dying subsequent to her
diagnosis. This fear would push her into rejecting the diagnosis,
into avoiding his physician, and into considering her fear of dying
as something else, maybe as an indeterminate anxiety, or even as a
mere bodily phenomenon.
It should be noticed that this notion of an affective M-
unconscious which is experienced but of which the subject is
not A-conscious is not altogether absent from Freud’s writings.
It is according to Freud one sense of “unconscious”: the sense of
unconscious as applied to affects. In a text in which he strug-
gles to deﬁne a precise and uniﬁed concept of the unconscious,
Freud notes that even though “it is of the essence of an emotion
that we should be aware of it, i.e., that it should become known
to consciousness (. . .) in psycho-analytic practice we are accus-
tomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and ﬁnd it
impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction “unconscious
consciousness of guilt”, or a paradoxical “unconscious anxiety”
(Freud, 1974, p. 3000)”. Unconscious affects, he says, are affects
that are separated from their representation and which the sub-
ject can accordingly experience even though he is not A-conscious
of their representational content. Being thus separated from their
representation, they do not convey information about their cate-
gory and their cause, and they cannot be used for rational control
(Freud, 1974, pp. 3000–3003). I have just argued that this sense of
the unconscious, which is tied to phenomenality and affectivity, is
the only consistent sense25.
5.4.2. The affective M-unconscious and the ﬁrst conceptual
problem of the M-unconscious
What about the ﬁrst conceptual problem? We evoked some solu-
tions that were not entirely satisfying. Those solutions relied on
the claim that despite their unconscious character,M-unconscious
states could be considered as personal level states because they
had some degree of availability. The problem with those solutions
was that they sounded like ad hoc maneuvers. The notion of P-
conscious states of which the subject is not A-conscious allows
us to argue quite independently that there are some states which,
although they are not sufﬁciently available to the subject for him
to be A-conscious of them, are nevertheless personal level states.
They are personal level states because they are conscious in the
phenomenal sense and because conscious states, in any intuitive
sense, are always personal level states.
6. CONCLUSION
Reviewing some recent work relevant to self-deception and the
M-unconscious we have provided a general theoretical argument
for its existence. We have assessed some inﬂuential empirical stud-
ies often mentioned as a vindication of the M-unconscious. We
have ﬁnally noted that the notion of M-unconscious suffered from
two important conceptual problems, which plague the empiri-
cal investigation of the M-unconscious, and which could only be
solved at the price of an important shift in understanding. Where
does this shift in its understanding leave us, relative to the gen-
eral argument and to the empirical evidence of M-unconscious
states?
6.1. REASSESSING THE GENERAL ARGUMENT: M-UNCONSCIOUS
AND APPARENT SELF-DECEPTION
TheM-unconsciouswas a good candidate to solve the paradoxes of
apparent self-deception and to provide an explanation of this vex-
ing phenomenon. The conceptual problems which afﬂict it could
however be considered like revenge paradoxes showing that the
notion is not that well suited for the job. The solution we proposed
to these revenge paradoxes, in terms of affective M-unconscious,
actually allows the M-unconscious to play the role it was designed
for. But it has us picture these states in a more Janetian and in a
less, or less straightforward, Freudian way. They would be states
that are dissociated from those states the subject is A-conscious
of, but states that are P-conscious nevertheless rather that totally
unconscious.
The only viable M-unconscious approach to apparent self-
deception would thus be what could be called a neo-dissociationist
approach. It should be noted that a few recent works fromAnthony
Marcel and his colleagues have revived such an approach to psy-
chic, and in particular emotional, phenomena (cf., e.g., Lambie
and Marcel, 2002).
25The same claim is made by the phenomenologist Henry (1985), in his important
Genealogy of Psychoanalysis.
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REASSESSING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As for the empirical evidence for the M-unconscious, our shift
in understanding seems to impose a disappointing conclusion.
The most promising evidence was obtained in studies of patients
from anosognosia. These studies, we concluded tended to favor
a neo-dissociationist picture of (some forms of) this condition
according to which the patients are not unambiguously uncon-
scious of their plegia. It is however far from clear that they favor the
neo-dissociationist picture of the M-unconscious defended here,
for it is not clear that patients suffering from anosognosia really
experience their plegia without being A-conscious of it. Lambie
and Marcel (2002) suggest that something close to the opposite
happenswith a subset of those patients (theywouldbeA-conscious
of their plegia in a detached way, but they would not experience it
directly, and they would not feel accordingly feel concerned about
it). As already mentioned, Hirstein (2006) emphasizes that they
have a reduced autonomic response (I do not know, however, of
any empirical study testing this).
In any case, we have seen that patients suffering from anosog-
nosia are very varied, and it is not excluded that a subgroup
of patients might indeed know, so to speak affectively and M-
unconsciously, about their plegia (maybe some of the patients
that Cocchini et al., 2010 classify as having a selective explicit
anosognosia).
Our shift in understanding also opens novel perspectives in the
empirical study of the M-unconscious. If M-unconscious states
are P-conscious, they might be easier to spot than it is usually
assumed.
Also some results interpreted as refuting the M-unconscious
might need to be reconsidered. For example a study by Gies-
brecht et al. (2007) showed that high dissociative tendencies were
associated with higher skin conductance (SC) response to an
emotional video. They concluded that
Our SC ﬁndings are difﬁcult to reconcile with the view
that dissociative experiences constitute a defense mecha-
nism that allows an individual to psychologically withdraw
from the impact of the situation. Such a mechanism should
reduce emotional engagement, thereby leading to lowered SC
responses.
If the M-unconscious is an affective M-unconscious and M-
unconscious are affective states the subject experience, however,
we should not expect defensive function to reduce emotional
engagement, but only, at best, to reduce the emotional engagement
associatedwith theA-consciousness of one’s emotions,whatmight
be called the second-order emotional engagement.More generally,
if this account of the M-unconscious is on the right track, it is a
mistake to think about ﬂattened affect and about the disorders in
which it occurs, like depersonalization disorders (Sierra, 2009), as
the possible result of repression.
Finally, and most importantly, this novel understanding pro-
vokes us to go and look further in the direction of affective
sciences, dual-process psychology and neuroeconomy in order
to ascertain the existence of a M-unconscious. We did ﬁnd, in
those ﬁelds, evidence for P-conscious states of which the subject
is not A-conscious. This is not enough to show that the lack of
A-consciousness is motivated, but it might be a good start.
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